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Abstract
John Greco believes that any satisfactory theory of testimonial
knowledge should explain its practical nature—how testimonial
knowledge pervades across cases in a way that much of our knowledge is
dependable. He offers six cases: children know from their mothers,
teachers (simple), friends know from each other and citizens (tricky), job
interviewers and interrogators know from interviewees (difficult). In §2, I
consider Greco’s formulation of these cases into the Reasons and Trust
(RT) Dilemma: reductionism is too demanding for simple cases and nonreductionism is too easy in difficult cases.
In §3, I begin by reframing Greco’s RT Dilemma. I will argue that
the horns of Greco’s dilemma against reductionism and non-reductionism
can be best understood as failing to accommodate the practical facts of
testimony. I will then propose an approach to testimonial justification,
knowing for. Hearers’ aims for knowing are related to the way hearers
acquire testimonial justification. The purpose of knowing for is to give a
comprehensive account of testimonial justification that includes
reductionism’s positive reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting
relationships. As a result, knowing for accommodates Greco’s six cases. In
§4, I apply knowing for to the reductionist conception of positive reasons.
In §5, I apply knowing for to the non-reductionist conception of a trusting
relationship. Even though my view of knowing for alleviates both
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reductionism and non-reductionism from Greco’s RT Dilemma, the
unintended consequence is dissolving the debate between reductionism
and non-reductionism.
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§1. Introduction
Consider a simple case of testimonial knowledge. Sarah tells her
small child, Katie, “There is milk in the refrigerator.” Katie listens to her
mother’s testimony and she knows that there is milk in the refrigerator.
Why is Katie justified in believing that this is so? In this case, Katie’s
justification is based on her trusting relationship with her mother. This
case is simple, because the hearer is alleviated of the burden of needing
additional grounds or evidence for accepting the testimony. Sarah says
something to Katie. Based on Katie’s trusting relationship with Sarah, she
knows it.
Now consider a difficult case of testimonial knowledge. Suppose
that Sarah works as a police interrogator who questions uncooperative
witnesses. After interrogating a witness for several hours, the person
says, “Marie robbed the bookstore.” Sarah then researches previous
robberies and gathers non-testimonially based reasons for corroborating
the witness’s testimony. This case is difficult, because the hearer is
burdened to acquire additional reasons for believing the testimony. Sarah
listens to the testimony. However, the witness’ testimony does not
suffice for Sarah knowing that Marie robbed the bookstore. Sarah must
also gather non-testimonially based reasons to know.
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In a tricky case originally proposed by Jennifer Lackey, suppose
that Sarah is visiting Chicago.1 She asks a passerby, “Where is the Sears
Tower?” The passerby says, “Two blocks east.” For Sarah to know the
location of the Sears Tower, her justification depends upon either having
non-testimonially based reasons or having a trusting relationship with the
passerby. Sarah may believe that further reasons are required for her to
know what the passerby says is true. On the other hand, Sarah may
believe that the communal relationship between members of the Chicago
community justifies her knowing that the Sears Tower is two blocks east.
This case is tricky because either reasons or trusting relationships could
be appropriate for a hearer to believe that the testimony is justified.
Sarah listens to the passerby, but does not clearly know why she is
justified in believing the testimony.
These cases indicate the methods of testimonial justification.
Simple cases suggest that hearers’ trusting relationships with speakers
ground the hearers’ belief that the testimony is justified; in contrast,
difficult cases show that hearers’ positive reasons ground the hearers’
belief that the testimony is justified. As for tricky cases, hearers may
plausibly believe that either trusting relationships or reasons ground their
justification.
1

Jennifer Lackey calls the case CHICAGO VISITOR. She employs the case to reject the
Credit Theory of Knowledge as answering the Value Problem. The credit theory has
become a popular answer to the Value Problem and the theory is held by many virtue
reliabilists such as John Greco and Wayne Riggs. For more on Lackey’s view, see Jennifer
Lackey, “Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know,” Synthese 158, 345–361.
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John Greco argues that any satisfactory theory of testimonial
justification must explain simple, difficult and tricky cases. Call the theory
of testimonial justification that explains difficult cases in terms of
hearers’ non-testimonially based reasons, or positive reasons,
reductionism.2 Label the theory of testimonial justification that explains
simple cases in terms of hearers’ trusting relationship with speakers, nonreductionism.3 Greco turns simple, difficult and tricky cases into a
dilemma against reductionism and non-reductionism, what I call, the
Reasons and Trust (RT) Dilemma: reductionism is too demanding in
simple cases and non-reductionism is too easy in difficult cases. On the
demandingness horn, the reductionist standard of positive reasons
prevents children from acquiring knowledge. On the easiness horn, the
non-reductionist’s standard of trusting relationships licenses gullibility,
because interrogators are licensed to accept false testimony from
witnesses.
Greco’s RT Dilemma can be understood as addressing further
problems for reductionism and non-reductionism. C.A.J. Coady,4 Robert

2

The label ‘reductionism’ has been profusely used in the history of philosophy from
David Hume to Rudolph Carnap and beyond. The origin of this view is traced back to
Hume and the origin of ‘non-reductionism’ derives from Thomas Reid. In the
epistemology of testimony, reductionism and non-reductionism are the two prominent
theories of testimonial justification.
3
The term, ‘non-reductionism’ is also referred to as ‘anti-reductionism.’
4
C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 7.
Audi5 and Jennifer Lackey6 draw out, what I call, the practical facts of
testimony: (1) testimony pervades across many areas of our knowledge
and (2) much of our knowledge depends on testimony.7 Both are widelyheld truths about testimony. First, testimony is ubiquitous in our
knowledge of science, journalism, geography, family history and many
other areas. Since reductionism holds that children do not know, this
theory fails to accommodate the practical fact that testimonial
knowledge is pervasive among children. Second, a massive amount of our
knowledge depends on testimony. Since non-reductionism holds that
interrogators have knowledge, this view fails to accommodate the
practical fact that testimony is dependable. In sum, reductionism and
non-reductionism fail to explain the pervasive and dependable facts of
testimony, respectively.
In this paper, I attempt to rescue both reductionism and nonreductionism from the horns of Greco’s RT Dilemma. What I intend to
show is that, even though neither reductionism nor non-reductionism
gets completely around the horns of Greco’s dilemma, the prospects of
both theories explaining the practical facts of testimony are optimistic.
In §2, I will outline Greco’s Reasons and Trust Dilemma against
5

Robert Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,”
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 4 (1997): 405-422.
6
Jennifer Lackey, “Testimony Acquiring Knowledge from Others,” eds. Alvin I. Goldman
and Dennis Whitcomb Social Epistemology Essential Readings, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2011), 71-91.
7
By ‘dependable’, the view is not necessarily tied to a reliabilist theory of knowledge or
any other theory that ultimately turns out true.
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reductionism and non-reductionism. In §3, I will then reframe Greco’s
dilemma. I will argue that the horns of Greco’s dilemma against
reductionism and non-reductionism can be best understood as failing to
comply with the practical facts of testimony discussed by Coady, Audi and
Lackey. Given my interpretation of Greco’s dilemma, I will then attempt
to save reductionism and non-reductionism with the same tool.
I will defend the view knowing for. Roughly, hearers’ aims for
acquiring testimonial knowledge are related to testimonial justification.
Knowing that the speaker’s testimony is for a police investigator, who will
have specific attitudes and conduct certain actions, plays a role in
determining what counts as the appropriate method of testimonial
justification. Positive reasons and trusting relationships are two methods
of testimonial justification. On this view, hearers’ beliefs and actions with
the speaker’s testimony is vital to the way that they become justified in
knowledge. Knowing that the testimony is for children, interrogators or
tourists, who have different aims for seeking knowledge, explains why
reasons are appropriate for investigators and trusting relationships are
appropriate for children. Thus, knowing for is a comprehensive theory of
testimonial justification, because it encompasses reductionism’s positive
reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting relationships to explain Greco’s
six cases.
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In §4, I will apply the view of knowing for to the reductionist
conception of a positive reason and the non-reductionist conception of a
trusting relationship. First, I will argue that positive reasons must be
commensurable with hearers’ aims for knowing. Reductionism does not
completely avoid the Greco’s dilemma but the view gets closer to
explaining the practical fact that testimony is pervasive. Second, I begin
by analyze empirical research about children’s trusting relationships with
their mothers. I will go on to identify empirically what counts as a trusting
relationship between children and mothers. In the spirit of knowing for, I
will then detail future experiments that test whether children and
interrogators acquire testimonial knowledge based on a trusting
relationship. The hope is to pave a way for non-reductionism to be
compatible with the practical fact that testimony is dependable and avoid
the Greco’s dilemma. Generally, if one is either a reductionist or nonreductionist, my view of knowing for should be very attractive. Positive
reasons and trusting relationships are compatible with the practical facts
of testimony, because both are based on the same foundation, knowing
for. At the same time, accepting knowing for includes the unintended
consequence of dissolving the disagreement between reductionism and
non-reductionism. The problem of testimonial justification—explaining
why hearers are justified in believing testimony—is not an issue between
reductionism’s positive reasons versus non-reductionism’s trusting
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relationships; rather, the problem of testimonial justification becomes an
issue of explaining the relation between the methods of testimonial
justification (positive reasons and trusting relationships) and hearers’
aims for knowledge.

§2.

Greco’s Reasons and Trust Dilemma
Hearers acquire testimonial knowledge in this general way: (a)

speakers have knowledge, (b) speakers transmit true or reliable
testimonially-based beliefs to hearers and (c) hearers believe that the
testimony is justified. If speakers do not know or transmit false or
unreliable testimony, hearers cannot acquire knowledge from testimony.
The issue of testimonial justification is explaining the specific way that
hearers are justified in believing the testimony.
Reductionism defends two claims: (1) “Reduction Component”
that testimonial knowledge is reducible to other basic epistemic sources
including perception, memory and inductive inference and (2) “PositiveReasons Component”—non-testimonially-based positive reasons
necessarily and sufficiently justify hearers’ beliefs in the testimony. The
former is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of testimony, and the
latter is a claim about testimonial justification. Generally, a ‘positive
reason’ is non-testimonially based evidence that justifies hearers’ beliefs
in the testimony. Hearers acquire positive reasons for belief by making
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deductive or inductive logical inferences from their perceptual faculty or
memory. In this way, the reductionist story of testimonial justification is
compatible with a principle of rationality—hearer knows that P based on
having a positive reason for believing that P. David Hume and Elizabeth
Fricker support versions of reductionism. Fricker claims, “The thesis I
advocate…is that a hearer should always engage in some assessment of
the speaker for trustworthiness. To believe what is assumed without
doing so is to believe blindly, uncritically. This is gullibility.”8 ‘Assessment’
is understood as requiring positive reasons for testimonial justification.
Hence, reductionism criticizes hearers, who immediately accept
testimony without positive reasons, for being gullible or irrational.
Non-reductionism proposes two theses: (1) Distinctiveness
Component—testimonial knowledge is an irreducible basic epistemic
source similar to perception, memory and induction—and (2) Entitlement
Component—hearers are entitled to believe a speaker’s testimony as
knowledge in the absence of defeaters. Thomas Reid and Tyler Burge
advocate versions of non-reductionism.9 Burge claims,
Our entitlement to ordinary perceptual belief is usually sufficient
for perceptual knowledge. It is usually sufficient even though we
may be unable specifically to rule out various possible defeating
conditions. If there is no reason to think that the defeating
8

Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility” in Knowing from Words, ed. B.K. Matilal and A.
Chakrabarti (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004): 145.
9
Given my criteria between reductionism and non-reductionism, theories such as
interpersonal relationship views are counted as non-reductionist views, because
justification is nonevidential and the interpersonal relationship is central to the
epistemology of testimony.
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conditions threaten, one has knowledge despite ignoring them.
Something similar holds for acquisition of belief from others.
Other things equal, ordinary interlocution suffices for
knowledge.10
Burge proposes that an interlocution explains why testimonial knowledge
is on par with perception, induction and memory as an irreducible or
basic epistemic source. However, for Burge, entitlement is not equivalent
to justification, because a subject must articulate her reasons for
justification. Alternative views have emerged to identify the irreducible
epistemic source. For example, John Hardwig claims, “The
trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is the ultimate
foundation for much of our knowledge”11 If one accepts that testimonial
knowledge is an irreducible epistemic source, one is committed to nonreductionism. For the purpose of this paper, I will narrowly deal with the
non-reductionist theory which holds that a trusting relationship explains
why testimonial knowledge is a basic epistemic source. Since hearers
have a trusting relationship with speakers, hearers become justified in
accepting a speaker’s testimony as knowledge except in the face of
defeaters. These are defeating reasons or reasons against accepting
testimony. There are psychological and normative defeaters.
Psychological defeaters are a hearer’s experiences, doubts or beliefs

10

Tyler Burge, “Content Preservationism,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4,
(1993): 457-488, 485.
11
John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88,
No. 12, (1991): 693-708, 694.
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which indicate that hearer’s belief is unreliably formed or false.12
Normative defeaters are experiences, doubts or beliefs that a hearer
ought to possess, because they indicate that the hearer’s belief is
unreliable or false given the available evidence. Hearers must be aware of
defeaters; if not, they commit epistemically unacceptable practices that
undermine testimonial justification.13
John Greco gives the following cases of testimonial knowledge:
difficult (1 and 2), tricky (3 and 4) and simple (5 and 6).
Case 1. A seasoned investigator questions a potentially
uncooperative witness.
Case 2. A job applicant tells you that he has no criminal record.
Case 3. You ask directions from a stranger in an unfamiliar city.
For example, where is the train station?
Case 4. You ask your friend whether he intends to come to your
party, and he says yes.
Case 5. A third-grade teacher tells her student that France is in
Europe.
Case 6. A mother tells her adolescent child that there is milk in the
refrigerator.14
Testimonial knowledge ranges from mildly helpful information to
powerful truths. Every day, children know about the locations of several
kinds of drinks and foods in refrigerators. Students learn about the
Earth’s distance from the sun and who will not attend the school dance.
Journalists interview sources to find the next story; investigators figure

12

Jennifer Lackey, “Introduction” in Epistemology of Testimony (eds.) Jennifer Lackey
and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006) 1-21, 4.
13
Jennifer Lackey, “Introduction,” 4.
14
John Greco, “Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information” in Epistemic
Evaluation (eds.) John Greco and David Henderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012 Forthcoming), 8.
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out who robbed the bookstore. These cases lead to contrasting views of
testimonial justification. Sometimes, justifying testimony is quick and
simple. If your mom says that the milk is in the refrigerator, you listen
and know where the milk is. In other cases, we are unsure about exactly
how to justify testimony. Testimonial justification is tricky. Moreover,
justifying a speaker’s testimony can be a lengthy and difficult process. For
example, jurors may take months or years to be justified in believing a
witness’ testimony. In difficult cases, testimony is imperative to whether
hearers acquire knowledge. It’s remarkable that testimonial knowledge
works at all.
Greco argues that reductionism and non-reductionism fail to
satisfactorily explain simple, tricky and difficult cases. He formulates
simple and difficult cases into the Reasons and Trust Dilemma:
1. Either testimonial knowledge requires reasons on the part of
the hearer or it does not.
2. If Reductionism is true, then testimonial knowledge requires
reasons on the part of the hearer. Testimonial knowledge
becomes too demanding; at least, cases of school teachers’
and mothers’ testimony to small children will not be included
as knowledge that should be included.
3. If Non-reductionism is true, then testimonial knowledge does
not require reasons on the part of the hearer. Testimonial
knowledge becomes too easy; at least, cases of police
investigators and job interviewers will not count as knowledge
that should be included.
4. Therefore, an adequate account of testimonial knowledge,
which includes both simple and difficult cases as genuine
knowledge, is impossible.15
15

John Greco “Testimonial Knowledge and Flow of Information” in Epistemic Evaluation,
(eds.) John Greco and David Henderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-10.
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A unified theory is challenging. The force of the dilemma lies in
developing a theory that is neither too demanding that it omits cases 5
and 6, nor too easy and losing the explanation to cases 1 and 2. The
epistemic standards of testimonial justification fluctuate between
demanding and easy. Testimonial knowledge for police investigators and
job interviewers (difficult) favor reductionism. Greco claims, “The
investigator asks questions and the witness answers them, but clearly the
investigator should not just believe whatever the witness says.”16
Investigators and interviewers demonstrate expert perception and
induction in discerning true from false testimony. Requiring positive
reasons to justify speakers’ testimony seems right. But when the same
standard of requiring reasons is applied to simple cases, the reasons
become too demanding for children to accept testimony from their
elders.
Testimonial knowledge for children knowing their mothers’
testimony favors non-reductionism. Greco affirms, “Here it is at least
plausible that something epistemically special is going on—that
testimonial justification and knowledge depends on a trusting
relationship between speaker and hearer that is present in this example
Greco emphasizes a relationship as something epistemically special. Others such as
Jennifer Lackey may consider this emphasis as an interpersonal view of testimony. For
my purposes, I align with Greco and develop the view as a possible non-reductionist
theory.
16
John Greco, “Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge” American Philosophical
Quarterly 49, 1 (2012): 15-28, 20.
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but not in the first.”17 The trusting relationship between children and
mothers allows children to accept their mother’s testimony as
knowledge. Intuitively, children appear to know without reasons.
Children listen to people with whom they have a close relationship, and
gain knowledge. If children do, in fact, have testimonial knowledge, nonreductionism is true about children knowing in the absence of defeaters.
But, of course, non-reductionism cannot help but also fail to appreciate
the positive reasons in difficult cases. Greco’s attack is limited to versions
of non-reductionism which hold that a trusting relationship makes
testimonial knowledge a basic epistemic source. Hearers are entitled to
accept testimony based on a trusting relationship with speakers.
However, a trusting relationship is not sufficient for interrogators’
justification. Interrogators need to be sure that the speaker’s testimony is
true. And yet, if interrogators need positive reasons for justification, this
reductionist view cannot explain why children know. This is the puzzle.
Next I will strengthen Greco’s RT Dilemma. As a result, the horns of the
RT dilemma are understood as general problems for reductionism and
non-reductionism.

17

John Greco, “Recent Work in Testimonial Knowledge,” 20.
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§3.

Knowing For
This section has two objectives. First, I will argue that Greco’s RT

Dilemma draws attention to two practical facts about testimony. Greco’s
objections leveled against reductionism and non-reductionism can be
understood as both theories failing to appreciate these practical facts.
Second, I will provide the groundwork for solving Greco’s dilemma by
defending a novel view called knowing for. I will argue for a relation
between testimonial justification and hearers’ aims for knowledge. The
hope is to explain why both positive reasons and trusting relationships
are satisfactory methods of testimonial justification for different cases. In
the next section, I will employ the view of knowing for to revise the
conceptions of positive reasons and trusting relationships for solving for
Greco’s RT Dilemma.
Greco argues that reductionism and non-reductionism fail as
satisfactory theories. Reductionism fails because it excludes children
from acquiring testimonial knowledge from their parents or teachers. The
intuition is that children, in fact, seem to know when reductionism claims
that they do not know. Non-reductionism fails because it includes
interrogators as acquiring knowledge from uncooperative witnesses. The
intuition is that interrogators, in fact, seem not to know when nonreductionism claims that they know. Greco’s RT Dilemma seems right but
why is it so?
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On my view, Greco’s RT Dilemma highlights two practical facts
about testimony. First, testimony is pervasive within our knowledge.
Second, much of our knowledge depends on testimony. C.A.J. Coady,
Robert Audi and Jennifer Lackey emphasize these widely-held truths.
Coady claims:
It seems then that testimony is very important in the formation of
much that we normally regard as reasonable belief and that our
reliance upon it is extensive. Furthermore, this reliance is not
limited to the everyday or the merely practical, since highly
developed theoretical activities are also marked by a reliance
upon testimony. This is particularly noticeable in the social
sciences and in such studies as history but it is also a feature of
the physical sciences... Inasmuch as a social science has a strong
historical element, like anthropology, then it will have a similar
reliance on testimony, but even such a discipline a psychology is
very dependent upon testimony for its data, as is evident from the
perusal of texts on social psychology or even perception.18
Coady emphasizes that testimony plays a role in our everyday and
theoretical activities. Robert Audi highlights the role of testimony in
epistemology:
Testimony is a pervasive and indispensable source of knowledge
and justification, and it may be significant for the theory of
communication and the psychology of belief acquisition as it is for
epistemology. It is a central concern of social epistemology, in
which philosophers have shown increasing interest.19
Audi distinguishes the practical fact that testimony is pervasive and the
fact that it is a dependable source of knowledge. Audi also points out the
implications of not recognizing the practical facts of testimony. He claims,
18

C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 8.
Robert Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification”
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 4, (October 1997): 405-422, 405.
19
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Much of human experience is occupied with speaking or listening
to others, and in life as we know it we could not have much
knowledge, if indeed we could know anything at all, without
relying on what others tell us.20
Jennifer Lackey suggests the universal acceptance of these practical facts
of testimony.
Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on
the testimony of others—what we eat, how things work, where
we go, even who we are. We do not, after all, perceive firsthand
the preparation of ingredients in many of our meals, or the
construction of the devices we use to get around the world, or the
layout of our planet, or our own births and family histories. There
are all things that we are told….Scientific discoveries, battles won
and lost, geographic developments, customs and traditions of
distant lands–all of these facts would be completely lost to us. It
is, therefore, no surprise that the importance of testimony, both
epistemological and practical, is nearly universally accepted.21
Coady, Audi and Lackey first point out that testimonial knowledge is
ubiquitous. Testimony pervades across countless areas and practices in
science, law, geography, history, communication, psychology, family and
many others. This is a descriptive fact about our everyday social
practices. Second, testimony is dependable in a way that makes our
practices mostly accurate. If we reject that testimony is a dependable
source of knowledge, then a problem arises. We would not actually know
much of what we take ourselves to know. In light of the practical facts, I
reframe Greco’s RT Dilemma to RT Dilemma*. Hopefully, the
20

Robert Audi. “Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (October 2011): DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00525.x, 125, 1.
21
Jennifer Lackey, “Testimony Acquiring Knowledge from Others” in Social Epistemology:
An Anthology (ed.) Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011): 71-91, 71.
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reconstruction will also make apparent the solutions for reductionism
and non-reductionism.
The RT Dilemma* is the following:
1. A satisfactory theory of testimonial justification must
accommodate the practical facts that testimonial knowledge is
pervasive and dependable.
2. If reductionism is true and does not include children as
acquiring testimonial knowledge from their parents or close
ones, reductionism fails to explain the practical fact that
testimony is pervasive.
3. If non-reductionism is true and includes interrogators as
acquiring testimonial knowledge from uncooperative
witnesses, non-reductionism fails to explain the practical fact
that testimonial knowledge is dependable.
4. Therefore, reductionism and non-reductionism fail to
accommodate the practical facts of testimonial knowledge.
RT Dilemma* showcases the roles that the practical facts play in Greco’s
dilemma. The practical fact of pervasiveness is a problem for
reductionism. Reductionism’s positive reasons requirement narrows the
cases of genuine testimonial knowledge. If reductionism cannot capture
all of these cases, such as children acquiring testimonial knowledge, the
view faces counterexamples. As a result, reductionists need a flexible
theory that aligns with the pervasiveness of testimony. On the other
hand, the practical fact of dependability is a problem for nonreductionism. Non-reductionism’s trusting relationship between speakers
and hearers is not always a dependable way for hearers to acquire
knowledge. If non-reductionism cannot capture the fact that we depend
upon testimony, such as interrogators acquiring testimonial knowledge,
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non-reductionism is unsatisfactory. Non-reductionists need an accurate
theory that accommodates the fact that testimony is dependable. In sum,
reductionist accounts need to be more flexible and non-reductionist
accounts need to be more accurate. How can this be done? On my view,
both theories advance their agendas so long as they are grounded in a
similar way.
I motivate the view of knowing for with two assumptions. The first
assumption is that testimonial knowledge is a relation between speakers
and hearers. The assumption derives from separate claims by Linda
Zagzebski and Robert Audi. Zagzebski describes a central feature of
knowledge, “Knowing is a relation between a conscious subject and an
object, where the object (but possibly not the immediate object) is some
portion of reality. The relation is cognitive. That is to say, the subject
thinks, not just senses or feels the object. More specifically, knowing
includes believing.”22 The take-home point is that knowledge involves a
relation. Zagzebski considers this idea to be a widely-held assumption. If
testimonial knowledge is an instance of knowledge, generally, we may
also say that testimonial knowledge involves a relation. Audi supports
this idea of testimony:
Testimony is normally social in having a recipient as well as an
attester. But we might allow, as a limiting case, solitary testimony,
as with what one writes in a diary. Even that kind of attestation is
implicitly social. It is at worst an idealization to conceive
22

Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology, (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2009), 3.
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testimony as social. We ourselves are hearers of even our silent
affirmations; our later selves are a potential audience for earlier
entries in a diary.23
Audi suggests that testimony involves a relation between speakers and
hearers. The relation is not necessarily social, because we can be both
speaker and hearer of our own testimony. For example, a relation exists
between speakers and their diaries. Consider a person at time, T1, who
writes words in her diary and then the same person reads her words at
time, T2. The person who is the speaker at T1 is the same person who is
the hearer at T2. The same person is related to herself at different times.
Moreover, a relation exists between my current self and the self who
hears my own silent affirmations. I can speak the words that I form and
be the only person who hears them. Given that knowledge is a relation
and testimony is a relation, it is obvious that testimonial knowledge is a
relation between speakers and hearers.
The second assumption is that testimonial justification comes in
degrees. This is also a widely-held assumption and can be indirectly
attributed to Susan Haack,
Ordinary usage of ‘knows,’ etc., is shifting and conflicting because
of an underlying tension: justification comes in degrees,
knowledge doesn’t. Justification comes in degrees; or, to put the
point another way, one may be more or less justified in believing
something. For instance, we speak of someone’s having good but
not conclusive evidence; of someone’s belief being flimsy
evidence; of someone’s having some justification for believing
23

Robert Audi, “Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, (2011) DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00525.x, 1-25, 3.
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such-and-such, but failing to take account of that fact that so-andso; of jumping to conclusions; of incomplete or—instructive
ambiguity—‘partial’ evidence.24
Haack’s view of the tension between knowledge and justification is
applicable for explaining testimonial knowledge and justification.
Hearers’ testimonial knowledge is definitive. Nevertheless, hearers
become justified in believing testimony in different ways. For children to
drink milk, a trusting relationship gives them an ‘adequate’ or maybe a
‘partial’ justification for knowing; on the other hand, positive reasons
mostly give us ‘conclusive’ justification. For the interrogator who wants
to know who robbed the bookstore, a trusting relationship with the
speaker is flimsy method of justification. Hence, the objection goes that a
trusting relationship does not explain the practical fact that testimony is
dependable. If justification comes in degrees, then a trusting relationship
is located toward the weaker side of the spectrum. A trusting relationship
is sometimes dependable enough for hearers to know. However, if the
knowledge is for interrogators, a trusting relationship is not dependable
enough to provide sufficient justification. Interrogators need conclusive
justification. Children do not always need conclusive justification.
Suppose that a child looks in the refrigerator and perceives the milk and
infers that there is milk in the refrigerator. This child has conclusive
justification. However, it is excessive to require that the child always
24
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perceive and inductively infer that the milk is in the refrigerator for the
child to know. If justification is understood in terms of positive reasons,
then the objection goes that requiring a positive reason does not explain
the practical fact that testimony is pervasive, because a positive reason is
an instance of conclusive justification and we can be justified without
having conclusive justification. Haack is correct that justification comes in
degrees. The way that positive reasons and trusting relationships work in
some cases but not all cases supports Haack’s view of a spectrum of
justification. Positive reasons and trusting relationships appear located
on opposite ends of this spectrum. As a result, what epistemologists need
is a comprehensive theory of testimonial justification that includes both
positive reasons and trusting relationships. If we accept that testimonial
knowledge is a relation between speakers and hearers and testimonial
justification comes in degrees, the idea of knowing for has traction.
We acquire testimonial knowledge for many aims. We aim to
know where the milk is, because we want to drink it. We aim to know
who robbed the bookstore, so that we can arrest them. We aim to know
the location of the Sears Tower in order to visit it. We even aim to know
because we are curious. Testimonial justification is related to our aims,
specifically with respect to identifying the appropriate method for
justifying testimony. The virtue of positive reasons prevails in difficult
cases. Interrogators are required to have reasons in order to know. The
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idea seems right, but why is it? One answer is that if the interrogator is
justified in knowing the witness’ testimony, the hearer will likely arrest
someone for committing a crime. Testimonial justification is difficult. The
virtue of trusting relationships flourishes in simple cases. A child has a
trusting relationship with her mother and knows that the milk is in
refrigerator based on that trust. Why is this idea right? If the child is
justified in knowing her mother’s testimony, she will likely use the milk to
drink it. Testimonial justification is simple. Surely, one may say, a child
knows the location of the milk based on trusting her mother. Both
theories seem right. How can this be so? My answer is that Greco’s cases
reveal a neglected feature of testimonial justification; that is, hearers’
aims for knowing is related to the methods of testimonial justification,
positive reasons and trusting relationships. If my view can explain why
positive reasons and trusting relationships are plausible, then the view
may provide insights for enhancing both theories.
Hearers’ aims for knowing are related to testimonial
justification.25 To motivate this view consider Case 7:
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Case 7. Tom, Jeff and Kim are roommates. Jeff and Kim are close
friends with each other. Tom is not close friends with Jeff and
Kim. In addition, Jeff and Kim usually tell each other accurate
testimonially-based beliefs. One night, Tom answers the door and
after greeting the person, he asks Kim, “What time did Jeff say
that he left Halo Bar?” Kim responds, “11:00pm.” Tom further
says, “Well, the cops are at the door and they want to know. Are
you sure?” Kim hesitates, “Hold on! I’m not that sure!”
Kim knows that Tom left the Halo Bar at 11:00pm. Kim’s friendship with
Jeff plays a role in partially justifying her knowledge. Furthermore, Kim
has background knowledge that Jeff usually tells her accurate testimony.
Kim may even feel confident in knowing that Tom left Halo Bar at
11:00pm. Now, if Tom wants to know the time and asks Kim, she says,
“11:00pm.” Yet, once the cops want to know and Kim knows that Tom
will tell the cops, Kim resists saying a definitive time. Suppose that Kim
does not believe that Jeff did anything wrong. Her reticence to tell Jeff an
explicit time remains appropriate, but why? The idea is that knowing for
Kim is, in some way, different than knowing for Tom and also knowing for
police officers. This is the rough intuition. Knowing for friends, strangers,
children and police investigators appears different. Why is this so? On my
view, hearers’ aims for knowing are related to hearers’ method of
testimonial justification, positive reasons or trusting relationship. If Tom
acquires testimonial knowledge from Kim, Tom’s aim is to tell the
information to police officers. Tom’s justification must be strong. If the
police officers acquire knowledge, their aims include beliefs and actions
toward Jeff. Suppose that the officers aim to arrest Jeff. Their justification
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should be even stronger than Tom’s justification. Reductionism’s account
of positive reasons is an appropriate method of testimonial justification
for the officers and Tom. Kim’s aims are different from Tom’s and the
police officers’ aims. Kim’s justification is based on her trusting
relationship with Jeff. Kim’s justification is sufficient for her to know but it
is not strong enough for Tom and the officers to know given their aims.
As soon as Kim knows that Tom will use her testimony to tell the police
officers, Kim says, “Hold on! I’m not that sure!” Furthermore, neither
Tom nor police officers have a trusting relationship with Jeff. Nonreductionism’s account of a trusting relationship is an appropriate
method for justifying Kim’s knowledge. Generally, Case 7 is a device to
bring out the relation between hearers’ aims for knowing and methods of
testimonial justification.
One may believe that testimonial justification is related to the
social roles among friends, strangers, children and interrogators. Based
on such social roles, hearers become justified in particular ways. For
example, if two people are friends and both have the social role of
friendship with the other, then both people are permitted to trust what
the other says. If the friends did not have this social role and are
strangers, then the people would need positive reasons to accept the
other’s testimony. The problem with this ‘social role’ view is that hearers’
social roles do not entirely inform the appropriate way to justify
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testimony. If we alter the aims for knowing, then some close friends
would rely on their trusting relationship; however the same friends
would also need positive reasons. For example, some friends may trust
each other when the knowledge is trivial. Greg asks Amanda, “Where is
the meeting?” Amanda responds, “At the coffee shop.” Greg may think,
“Now, I know that the meeting is at the coffee shop.” Why? Greg trusts
Amanda. However, if Greg is delivering a speech that can drastically help
or harm his career, Greg may want to be sure that the meeting is in the
coffee shop. Greg may not merely trust Amanda but want positive
reasons for justification. In this way, hearers’ aims for knowing seem
related to knowledge.
The view of knowing for becomes transparent:
Knowing For: A hearers’ aim for acquiring testimonial knowledge
is related to what counts as the appropriate method of
testimonial justification.
The methods of testimonial justification include, but are not limited to,
reductionism’s positive reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting
relationships. The crux of the view lies in specifying what hearers’ aims
are. I define ‘aims’ as hearers’ attitudes and actions. Hearer’s ‘attitudes’
include the following: beliefs, desires, intentions and goals. Hearer’s
‘actions’ involve directed or intentional actions and excludes merely
bodily movement. Hearers strive to know in order to form other beliefs
or have other attitudes. For example, I ask Dave who won the football
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game between the University of Missouri and University of Georgia. I
want to know in order to form beliefs about which team is better than
the other. Or, I may ask Dave because I bet that University of Georgia
would win, and I plan to use my winnings to pay back my student loans.
However, I may want to know just to know. Regardless of what aim the
knowledge is for, there is one. In simple cases, when a child asks about
the location of milk, we assume that the testimonial knowledge is for
satisfying the hearer’s desire to get milk. In difficult cases, the testimony
is for knowing whether a person committed a crime. The simplicity and
difficulty of these cases depends, to some extent, on what the testimony
is for. A child satisfying her desire to drink milk is less important of an aim
than an officer arresting someone. Given the significance of the hearers’
aims, it is obvious for why reductionism and non-reductionism appear
right at first glance. The reductionist’s positive reasons are appropriate
for the officer to be justified in arresting someone. The non-reductionist’s
trusting relationship is appropriate for the child to be justified in
satisfying her desire to drink milk. There is a balance between the
methods that hearers justify testimony and hearers’ aims for acquiring
knowledge. Arresting a person is serious, so your justification better be
strong. A child drinking milk is trivial, so your justification can be
something accordingly weak. Both reductionism and non-reductionism
can seek this balance between testimonial justification and the hearers’

Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 30.
aims. In this way, there is little disagreement between both theories.
Instead of worrying about the legitimacy of either camp, the issue is
establishing the balance between the methods of testimonial justification
and hearers’ attitudes and actions. The view of knowing for is compatible
with tricky cases.
What does knowing for say about tricky cases? Some tricky cases,
such as direction cases, do not suggest a particular method of testimonial
justification. For example, consider Lackey’s original Chicago visitor case.
Morris is a tourist in Chicago and he asks a passerby on the street for
directions to the Sears Tower. The passerby says, “Two blocks east.” Why
is Morris justified? I’m not sure. No information suggests that Morris has
a trusting relationship with passerby citizens in Chicago or any sort of
communal relationship with people. Morris does not acquire positive
reasons. The view of knowing for remains useful, because this view does
not commit one to a particular method of testimonial justification. Any
method of testimonial justification is compatible with my view so long as
the method takes into account hearers’ aims for knowing. For example, if
you are a tourist, who wants to visit the Tower, then believing that
testimony is justified may be based on a tour guide’s testimony.
However, suppose that you are a cartographer, who is creating a map of
the city of Chicago. You would not request testimony from a city guide;
rather, you would likely ask your excellent research assistant. You may
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not merely accept what your assistant says, but further request that the
researcher give primary and secondary sources. You may believe that
since you are creating a map of the city, you must precisely know the
locations of the city’s buildings. Testimonial knowledge for visiting the
Sears Tower as opposed to creating a map is justified in different ways.
Let us return to the origin of this inquiry. The problem for
reductionism and non-reductionism is that neither captures Greco’s
difficult, tricky and simple cases as genuine knowledge. My proposal of
knowing for accomplishes this task. Why is a seasoned investigator
justified in believing a potentially uncooperative witness? Why is a job
interviewer justified in believing that the interviewee does not have a
criminal record? If you want to know the location of a train station and
you ask a stranger for directions, why are you justified in believing the
passerby? If you ask your friend whether she will go to the party, how do
you know what she says is true? If a third-grade teacher tells her student
that France is in Europe, then why does the third-grade student know?
And finally, if a mother tells her adolescent child that there is milk in the
refrigerator, why is the child justified in believing that this is so? Knowing
for holds that hearers’ aims for knowing is related to the correct method
of testimonial justification. The investigator’s aim to possibly arrest
someone, job interviewer’s aim to hire someone in their company, your
aim to visit the Sears Tower, your aim to go to the party, a child aim to

Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 32.
know that France is in Europe and drink milk are related to determining
the appropriate way to be justified in believing a speaker’s testimony.
Overall, my view progresses the stagnant debate between reductionism
and non-reductionism.
Broadly speaking, what should we do with reductionism and nonreductionism? Any staunch reductionist or non-reductionist is an
opponent to my view of knowing for. However, recent work in the
epistemology of testimony includes this trend of rejecting both
reductionism and non-reductionism. Audi claims, “It should be evident
that I am rejecting both wholesale reductionism and wholesale antireductionism.”26 Others reject the debate and offer alternative analyses
of testimony. Lackey claims,
In showing the need for positive epistemic work from both the
speaker and hearer, then, we have seen that testimonial
justification or warrant is neither reducible to nor completely
independent from sense perception, memory, and inductive
inference. Thus, insofar as we wish to make genuine progress in
the epistemology of testimony, we need to move beyond the
debate between reductionism and non-reductionism.27
Speakers and hearers must perform positive epistemic work. Neither
reductionism nor non-reductionism can account for the positive
epistemic work from speakers and hearers; thus, Lackey rejects the
reductionism and non-reductionism. In this way, Lackey may agree with
my assumption that testimonial knowledge is a relation between
26
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speakers and hearers, because both hearers and speakers are related by
their positive epistemic work. However, on my view, the debate between
reductionism and non-reductionism diminishes, because both theories
are grounded in the same way, knowing for. After we recognize that
there is a relation between the methods of testimonial justification and
hearers’ aims for knowledge, we can explain why positive reasons are
appropriate for interrogators to know and trusting relationships are
appropriate for children to know. We must cast out the labels of
‘reductionism’ and ‘non-reductionism’ because explaining why hearers
are justified in believing testimony is answered by explaining the relation
between the methods of testimonial justification and hearers’ aims for
knowledge. In the next two sections, I apply knowing for to the
conceptions of a positive reason and a trusting relationship.

§4

Improving Positive Reasons
According to Greco and others, the reductionist positive reasons

requirement is too demanding for some hearers to know. It comes as no
surprise that the reductionist camp has dwindled in number, while the
non-reductionist camp grows.28 Until this point, I have discussed knowing
for as a comprehensive view of testimonial justification. In this section, I
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will apply knowing for to the reductionist conception of a positive reason.
A positive reason is typically defined as non-testimonially based
evidence to be justified in believing the testimony. Examples of nontestimonially based evidence include perception, memory, deductive or
inductive logical methods. More precisely, the view asserts,
Positive Reason: For consideration C, to be a reason, R, for hearer,
H, to justify believing that P, there must be some C that is
reducible to perception, memory and induction, C must be nontestimonially based belief and the truth of C evidentially supports
the truth of P.
Here, ‘consideration C’ is understood as perceptual, memory or
inductive-based knowledge. All positive reasons are considerations but
not all considerations are positive reasons. Considerations, which are not
reasons, can affect what it takes to be a reason for believing that the
testimony is justified.29 For considerations to be positive reasons, the
truth of the consideration must evidentially support the truth of the
testimony. Now, let us see how the idea of knowing for can be applied
here.
To maneuver the conception of a positive reason away from
Greco’s horn that positive reasons are too demanding, this conception
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proposes that what counts as a positive reason must be commensurable
with hearers’ aims for knowing.
Commensurability Principle: For consideration, C, to be a reason,
R, for a hearer, H, to justify believing that P, there must be some C
such that the evidential support is commensurable with the
degree of significance that knowing how believing that P is
justified affects H’s aims for acquiring testimonial knowledge.
The Commensurability Principle states that the evidential support for P is
also commensurable with the degree of significance of knowing for the
hearer. The degree of significance is how a hearer’s testimonial
knowledge that P affects the H’s aims. All hearers believe and act
differently after acquiring testimonial knowledge. These attitudes and
actions affect the hearer in a multitude of unpredictable ways. One may
encourage a value metric of the hearer’s attitudes and actions. Knowing
the value of the hearer’s attitudes and actions would determine the sort
of positive reason to know. However, this view need not be restricted to
merely a value metric. For example, suppose that you have waited all of
your life to visit the Sears Tower. You have a passion for architecture and
love its king design. You are walking in Chicago and become lost trying to
find it. As you look for directions, you consider asking a random passerby
similar to most tourists. However, based on your passion for the Sears
Tower’s architecture, you really don’t want to waste your time depending
on a random person. Instead, you go out of your way to gather positive
reasons by finding an expert tour guide and even use your binoculars to
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find the building’s location. In this case, assigning a value to your
attitudes and actions appears inappropriate because it is based on your
passion to visit the Sears Tower. As a result, I would encourage
reductionists not to restrict or even necessarily identify exactly what
degree of significance that the testimony holds for speakers; rather, they
should develop the conceptual tools that include most, if not all cases of
testimonial knowledge as genuine. If reductionism can accommodate
how what counts as a positive reason for testimonial justification is
different for each hearer, then reductionism is not as demanding as
Greco would have us believe. For example, we would say that something
is wrong in a court case when the judge, who rules over the case, does
not actually hear the speaker’s testimony. If the judge is going to rule in a
particular case, then she must hear it for herself. However, would we also
say that something is wrong if a citizen, who is also epistemically
interested in knowing the speaker’s testimony, does not hear it with their
own senses? Both the judge and citizen want to know what the person
said. However, the citizen is merely curious about the case. It seems that
if the citizen listens to the testimony from other speakers or through a
transcript, the citizen knows. For the judge and citizen, the evidential
support is commensurable with the degree of significance of their aims
for knowledge.
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This account of positive reasons picks out why some
considerations become reasons for this hearer and not reasons for
another hearer. The virtue of this account is to achieve some flexibility
for justifying testimony. Despite the generally correct characterization
that reductionism is too demanding, on my view, what counts as a
positive reason for this or that hearer fluctuates between different
hearers’ aims or their attitudes and actions. Since every hearer will
inevitably believe and act differently based on the speaker’s testimony,
this account of positive reasons accommodates how hearers must
acquire different sorts of positive reasons and why those reasons are
appropriate in some cases but not others. Generally, the traditional
reductionism account has yet to explain why children know. However, my
view casts a wider net in apprehending the practical fact that testimony is

pervasive.

§5

Improving Trusting Relationships
Non-reductionism holds that hearers know if and only if (1)

speakers have a trusting relationship with speakers (2) there are no
defeaters. The methods of testimonial justification include a trusting
relationship and the absence of defeaters. A trusting relationship is a
promising candidate as an irreducible epistemic source, because it
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explains the practical fact that testimony is pervasive.30 Melissa Koenig, a
developmental psychologist, claims,
[Children and adults] ordinarily take people at their word. When a
speaker reports some fact, the listener believes the report simply
because of the trust they place, not in the utterance, but in the
speaker. The speaker, in these cases, is the object of appraisal and
it is based on her authority that testimony is accepted.31
Here, Koenig emphasizes that the trust between speakers and hearers is
a regular occurrence. Hearers know, not based on the content of words,
but the speaker’s authority. If we accept the practical fact that testimony
is pervasive and non-reductionism does not burden hearers by requiring
that they have positive reasons, then the non-reductionist component of
a trusting relationship is useful. However, Greco argues that nonreductionism fails to explain why interrogators acquire testimonial
knowledge. His criticism can be best understood as non-reductionism
failing to explain the practical fact that testimony is dependable. A
trusting relationship is a low degree of justification. Thus, a trusting
relationship is not dependable enough to provide sufficient justification
when the knowledge is for interrogators or other difficult cases. The path
for a solution is to revise the conception of a trusting relationship in
order to also explain the practical fact that testimony is dependable.
I motivate non-reductionism by giving two studies on its empirical
30

There are many versions of non-reductionism, specifically disagreement about what is
the irreducible feature of testimonial knowledge.
31
Melissa Koenig and Paul Harris “The Basis of Epistemic Trust” Episteme: A Journal of
Social Epistemology Vol. 4 Issue. 3, (2007): 264-284, 277.

Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 39.
plausibility. First, I will give empirical research that suggests children
employ defeaters for rejecting a speaker’s testimony. If children employ
defeaters, then the study leans toward the non-reductionist requirement
that hearers accept testimony in the absence of defeaters. I’ll then delve
into empirical research on what makes a trusting relationship so
epistemically special. After I evaluate the research, I apply the notion of
knowing for to the non-reductionist conception of a trusting relationship.
Given my revised conception of a trusting relationship, I’ll propose future
empirical research for non-reductionism to account for the fact that
testimony is dependable. Koenig discusses a study that displays children’s
ability to employ defeaters for rejecting a speaker’s testimony as
knowledge. Dias and Harris and Leevers and Harris independently
showed that four-, five- and six-year old children are capable of early
syllogistic reasoning.32 In a study conducted by Lee, Cameron, Doucette
and Talwar, they support that children use defeaters before accepting
testimony as knowledge. The team found that children in preschool use
their prior knowledge when evaluating what someone says.33 A speaker
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says to the children, “As the speaker was away, a ghost jumped out of the
book and broke a drinking glass.” Three-year olds accept the speaker’s
statement as true, however, most six-year olds say that the speaker
broke the glass. Even though the speaker may not have broken the glass,
some children minimally believe that the ghost did not break the glass.
Koenig argues,
This early ability to distinguish true from false assertions is some
of the first evidence we have of children’s capacity for
distinguishing between testimonial input that is consistent with
their beliefs and input that goes against their beliefs. This
sensitivity to counterevidence is part of what makes it possible to
credit children, even toddlers, with testimonial knowledge.34
These children’s capacity to discriminate is how they choose between the
testimony from others and what they believe. Here, we can identify their
capacity to discriminate and background knowledge of ghosts and
drinking glasses as giving them defeaters. The children, who say that the
speaker broke the glass, know that the ghost did not break the glass. In
this sense, six-year-olds have a defeater or reason against accepting
testimony as knowledge—ghosts cannot break drink glasses. On the
other hand, the three-year old children, who accept the speaker’s
testimony that the ghost broke the glass, lack such a defeater.
Importantly the empirical research demonstrates that some six-year olds
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have defeaters. Since the empirical research demonstrates that some
children employ defeaters for rejecting testimony, we can now turn to an
empirical analysis on a trusting relationship.
Paul Harris and Kathleen Corriveau, who are child developmental
psychologists, tested 147 five-year-old children, who have three different
types of attachments with their mothers: avoidant, secure and anxious.
These attachment types are interactive behaviors. Avoidant attachment
is a child who rarely or does not seek proximity to or contact with the
mother.35 The child is preoccupied with play when the adult enters the
room. The child does not display a desire for contact. If an adult picks up
the child, the child merely accepts the contact. A secure attachment is a
child who can be comforted by strangers, “but it is clear that she wants
her mother.”36 The child clearly desires contact but displays relatively
little effort to gain contact. An anxious attachment is the child who
displays “moderate –to-strong seeking of proximity to their mother.”37
Proximity seeking behavior includes a child purposefully approaching the
adult by creeping, crawling or walking. The child may clamber up or grasp
the adult in order to gain contact. In the groups, 26 children were
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avoidant attachment, 96 children had secure attachment and 25 had
anxious attachment relationships. All of the children were shown pictures
of 50-50 animal hybrids, such as a cow-horse.38 Remember, since the
ambiguous objects are 50-50 hybrids, children are neither right nor
wrong for choosing the mother’s or stranger’s testimony. The mother
and stranger told the children different names of the object, such as
either a horse or a cow. After receiving conflicting testimony, children
chose which speaker was correct. In the results, Harris claims, “Children
with an avoidant attachment to their mother treated her no differently
from a stranger, whereas the other two groups trusted the claims made
by their mother over those made by the stranger.”39 Children with
avoidant attachment were slightly more likely to pick the stranger’s, 53%,
than the mother’s testimony, 47%. For secure attachment relationships,
children sided with their mother 64% of the time and 34% chose the
stranger. In anxious attachment relationships, 75% of the children
accepted their mother’s testimony and picked the stranger 25% of the
time. But, what exactly is it about their relationship that is epistemically
significant? According to the study, the explanation for why children
accept their mother’s testimony is not having any sort of relationship
with their mothers; rather, children need a secure or anxious relationship
38
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to accept testimony. Children in anxious and secure relationships were
statistically more likely to accept their mother’s testimony than children
in avoidant attachment relationships. An implication is that we can
narrow the candidates of special irreducible features to secure and
anxious relationships. For instance example, Frederick Schmitt who
supports non-reductionism claims, "Children are so constituted
psychologically that they tend to prefer their caretakers or parents as
sources of information and also as sources of information about where to
get information.”40 Every child is not psychologically disposed to prefer
their parent’s testimony. Schmitt’s view is only accurate about children
with anxious and secure attachment relationships. He further argues,
“The process of selecting testimony is a social process in which the child’s
disposition to prefer caretakers as sources of information cause the child
to defer to the caretaker’s choices of testimonial sources for the child.
And this social selection process is metareliable.”41 Schmitt claims that
children further depend on their caregivers to tell them the correct
sources of information. If children with anxious and secure relationships
depend on their parent’s testimony in a strong way as Schmitt suggests,
the apparent question is, “What constitutes a secure and anxious
relationship that makes it epistemically significant?”

40

Frederick Schmitt, “Social Epistemology” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (eds.)
John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999): 354-382, 367.
41
Frederick Schmitt, “Social Epistemology,” 367.

Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 44.
One response is a version of Jennifer Lackey’s criticism against the
Interpersonal View of Testimony (IVT). This view holds (1) the features of
an interpersonal relationship between speakers and hearers, including a
speaker giving her assurance or inviting the hearer to trust, confer
epistemic value on the hearer’s acquired testimony (2) epistemic
justification is non-evidential.42 Lackey questions the epistemic relevance
of a speaker giving her assurance or inviting a hearer to trust.
Analogously, one may question that epistemic relevance of a secure or
anxious relationship. Instead of attributing knowledge to children, we
should recognize that children are making poor inferences. Children infer
from their mother’s social behavior, proximity and physical contact with
them to the idea that their mother transmits reliable testimony. But,
what is epistemically relevant about proximity and physical contact? This
is a false correlation argument. Children can appropriately infer from
their mother’s emotional social interaction that the mother is a good
person or someone who makes one feel protected, but these reasons are
inappropriate when applied to justifying the name of an ambiguous cowhorse or bear-pig object. The mother’s social interaction does not clearly
bear any epistemic import onto whether or not she is a reliable testifier.
Any non-reductionist, including Schmitt, needs to explain the epistemic
significance of a trusting relationship.
42

Advocates of this view include Ross (1986), Hinchman (2005), Moran (2006) and
Faulkner (2007).
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Another response for the epistemic significance of a trusting
relationship comes from Harris, who provides a parting shot against
entitlement theories of justification about children,
Despite a long-standing assumption, especially within philosophy,
that young children don’t doubt what they are told, it is clear that
children can be more or less skeptical. They are willing to put their
questions to someone they know, and they often (but not always)
accept what that person says. They hesitate to place their trust in
a stranger. Indeed, even their trust in someone they know is not
automatic. Its strength varies, depending on the type of emotional
relationship that the child has to the person in question.43
Initially, Harris endorses non-reductionism, because children, in fact, do
accept testimony depending on their kind of relationship with the
speaker.44 However, it is not a ringing endorsement. Harris rejects the
non-reductionist’s Entitlement Component that children blindly accept
testimony as knowledge. Instead, children observe whether speakers are
reliable testifiers. Children doubt what others tell them. Children’s
trusting relationships with their caregivers varies based on their
emotional relationship with caregivers. Importantly, notice that Harris
equates the trusting relationship as an emotional relationship. The
problem then for advocates of a trusting relationship is to explain how a
trusting relationship is not exclusively an emotional relationship but also
an epistemic one.

43

Paul Harris and Kathleen H. Corriveau “Young Children’s Selective Trust in Informants,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society Biological Sciences (2011): 366, 11791187, 1181.
44
After a prolonged period of neglect, children in Romanian orphanages in the
Ceausescu regime displayed indiscriminate trust towards familiar and unfamiliar adults.
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The idea of knowing for is helpful to defend non-reductionism.
Proponents of non-reductionism can create future empirical research to
confirm or deny: (1) the epistemic relevance of trusting relationships and
(2) whether a trusting relationship can explain the fact that testimony is
dependable. For the first task, empirical research can test a trusting
relationship in different scenarios. For example, if children know that
getting the right answer leads to their receiving either chocolate or
broccoli to eat, then the question becomes would children in avoidant
attachment relationships accept their mother’s testimony more than a
stranger’s testimony? Do the results change when knowledge is for
broccoli as opposed to chocolate? If a child wants to eat chocolate more
than broccoli, then knowing that the testimony is for chocolate creates
an extra incentive to be right. Children with an avoidant attachment
relationship with their mothers may accept their mother’s testimony
when the stakes are higher.
Second, non-reductionism can get closer to capturing the fact that
testimony is dependable. Non-reductionists can examine research that
tests whether interrogators and uncooperative witnesses, in fact, build
trusting relationships with each other without positive reasons. Suppose
that two interrogators work the good cop/bad cop routines or similar
ones to form a trusting relationship with uncooperative witnesses. If cops
know the speaker’s testimony based on good cop/bad cop routines or
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any strategy without positive reasons, then non-reductionism can show
why a trusting relationship explains why testimony is dependable.
Empirical research on the effectiveness of similar tactics that build
trusting relationships will determine the success or failure of this version
of non-reductionism.

§6

Conclusion
This paper began by examining Greco’s everyday cases of

testimonial knowledge. All six cases exemplify two practical facts:
testimony is pervasive and dependable. Greco turns these cases into the
RT Dilemma that challenges the dominant reductionist and nonreductionist theories of testimonial justification. According to the
dilemma, both reductionism and non-reductionism fail to capture the
practical facts of testimony. My contribution is to solve Greco’s dilemma
by explaining all six cases in the same way, knowing for. Hearers’ aim for
knowing is related to the appropriate way for hearers to justify their
testimonial beliefs. Testimonial justification is a matter of degrees.
Knowing for is capable of explaining the spectrum of testimonial
knowledge that encompasses positive reasons and trusting relationships;
while at the same time, abandoning the debate between reductionism
and non-reductionism. After explaining Greco’s cases, I apply knowing for
to develop enhanced conceptions of a positive reason and a trusting
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relationship. On my view, positive reasons are more flexible account of
positive reasons that leans closer to explaining the pervasive fact of
testimony. Moreover, I considered empirical research on children’s
trusting relationships with their mothers. I argue that additional studies
are needed on children and proposed new experiments on interrogators
to determine whether a trusting relationship is a dependable epistemic
source. Even though, I have yet to offer a complete theory of testimonial
knowledge, any theory of testimonial justification must consider the
arguments presented here.
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Appendix A: Examples of 50-50 hybrids

Figure 1. 50-50 Horse-Cow

Figure 2. 50-50 Pig-Bear
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